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Theory dependence: The term theory dependence describes how the theoretical perspective of a scientist or researcher influences their observations and interpretations of data. This means that scientists who hold different theories may interpret the same data differently. See also theories, method, observation, experiments.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Gerhard Schurz on Theory Dependency - Dictionary of Arguments

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Theory dependence/observation/Schurz: at present, theory dependence is half-heartedly accepted by the majority of scientists. (Chalmers 1994(1),20-31, Nagel 1979(2),79).
E.g. Suppose two theories with conflicting predictions: with complete theory dependence,
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then the observations of the representatives would be determined only by their theoretical expectations! These would then be self-fulfilling predictions Total circle of justification: one believes in the theory because one has observed its prediction and this because one believes in the theory.
Theory dependence/Schurz: five arguments in favor:
1. Experience is theory-guided: selection of experience for relevance is essential. This selection is theory-guided: according to it, I determine which observations to look for.
>Theory-ladenness
.
Vs: this is true, but it does not follow that observation itself is theory-guided. Proponents of contradictory theories can make the same observations.
2. Perception is an (unconscious) process of construction and interpretation: ex. ambiguities and illusions, ex. R-D-head (Jastrow), tilt pictures: are supposed to prove the theory dependence of perception.
>Rabbit-Duck-Head.
Vs: the cognitive psychological findings only refute the so-called direct realism, according to which we see things as they are. But they also show something else: that our perceptions are radically independent of background assumptions and background knowledge! (Fodor 1984(3), Pylyshyn, 1999(4))
Deception/Fodor: Deceptions present themselves equally to everyone, no matter how much the person has been educated about the fact that it is a deception.
>Deceptions.
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Solution: the processes of perception are based on innate mechanisms.
Theory dependence/perception/solution/Schurz: The solution is then the dependence on acquired background knowledge (not on innate mechanisms).
Theory independence/perception/Schurz: individuals with different background knowledge make the same perceptions.
>Background, >Perception.
3. Scientific observation data are theory dependent: here it is about observation by means of instruments (telescope, microscope etc.). Then the theories are mostly theories about the functioning of the measuring instruments.
>Theory/Duhem, >Method/Duhem.
pragmatic notion of observation/VsQuine: one cannot check everything at the same time.
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4. Continuity argument/Maxwell 1962(5)/Carnap 1962(6)/Hempel 1974(7)/Schurz: thesis: there is a continuous transition from observability with the naked eye, via glasses, magnifying glasses etc. to finally the electron microscope. Then "observation" is arbitrary.
>Observation.
Vs: First, the fact that there is a continuous transition between black and white does not imply that there is no difference between black and white. Second, there are distinctive cuts in this transition.
5th observation is language and culture dependent/cultural relativism:
>Humboldt, >Sapir-Whorf thesis.
Thesis we can only perceive what is pre-drawn in our language by concepts,
Vs: from the fact that languages have special concepts, it does not follow that one cannot have certain sense experience.
Sense experience/VsWhorf: experience itself is not language-dependent. This would only be so if others were not able to learn foreign observational terms by ostension. However, this ability to learn is always present.
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Ostension/VsWhorf: Ostension works just essentially nonverbal!
>Pointing, >Ostension, >Language dependence.


1. Chalmers, D. (1994). Wege der Wissenschaft. Berlin: Springer.
2. Nagel, E. (1979). Teleology Revisited and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press.
3. Fodoer, J. (1984). "Observation Reconsidered". Philosophy of Science 51, 23-43.
4. Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). "Is Vision Continouus with Cognition?", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 341-365.
5. Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities". In. Feigl,H. and Maxwell,G. (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962.
6. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966).
7. Hempel, C. (1974). Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften. München: DTV. (Engl. Orig. 1966).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29
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